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Abstract 
Effects of opportunity for thought and 
individual differences in intolerance of 
ambiguity on attitude polarization were 
examined. It was expected that opportunity 
for thought and intolerance of ambiguity 
would have an interactive effect on attitude 
polarization. This hypothesis was not 
supported. There was, however, an 
unexpected interaction between intolerance of 
ambiguity and the order of events in this 
experiment. When individuals’ self-awareness 
was heightened, individuals intolerant of 
ambiguity had attenuated attitudes; when 
individuals’ self-awareness was lessened, 
individuals intolerant of ambiguity had 
polarized attitudes. Limitations of this study 
(e.g., self-report measure) and future 
directions (e.g., priming effects) for this 
research were also discussed.  
 
During the 2004 presidential election, 
the people of the United States were divided 
on which candidate to vote for as president. 
President George W. Bush was campaigning 
for reelection and Senator John Kerry was 
campaigning to win the position of president. 
Some individuals favored President George 
W. Bush because he supported personal 
responsibility for social security. Other 
individuals favored Senator John Kerry 
because he supported government 
responsibility for social security. Individuals’ 
attitudes not only differed toward each 
candidate, but individuals’ attitudes also 
varied in intensity (i.e., extremity). In some 
cases, individuals donated money in support 
of their party, whereas other individuals stood 
along busy roadways flashing signs in support 
of their party. Some individuals voted; others 
did not vote. Perhaps individuals’ behavior 
during the election reflected their attitudes 
about each candidate. It may be possible that 
individuals who campaigned for their 
candidate or gave donations to a political 
party displayed more attitude extremity than 
individuals who simply voted or held private 
opinions. 
How and why do individuals’ attitudes 
become so extreme that individuals would 
spend valuable time campaigning or 
personally funding a political party?  One 
explanation for these individuals’ extreme 
attitudes is the influence of thought on 
attitudes. When individuals think about 
people, objects, events, or issues, initially 
positive attitudes may become more positive 
and initially negative attitudes may become 
more negative (e.g., Clary, Tesser, & 
Downing, 1978; Tesser & Conlee, 1975; 
Tesser & Sadler, 1973). This phenomenon is 
known as self-generated attitude change (see 
Tesser, Martin, & Mandolia, 1995, for a 
review). If, for example, Jesse Jackson, a 
human rights activist, makes a good 
impression with potential supporters, then 
those supporters will think positively about 
Jesse Jackson. The more these supporters 
think positively about Jesse Jackson, the more 
favorable their attitudes become toward Jesse 
Jackson.  
 
Self-Generated Attitude Change  
There are two processes underlying 
self-generated attitude change (Tesser 1978; 
Tesser et al., 1995). First, when individuals 
engage in thought, individuals may change 
their beliefs (e.g., Liberman & Chaiken, 1991; 
Tesser & Cowan, 1977; Valenti & Tesser, 
1981). When asked to think about the 2004 
presidential debate between Bush and Kerry, 
for example, individuals do not simply recall 
information about that event in a mechanical 
way. Thinking is a dynamic process meaning 
that when asked to recall information about 
the 2004 presidential debate, individuals often 
change what they believe to be true about that 
event. 
During thought, individuals may 
change their beliefs so that these beliefs 
become consistent with individuals’ original 
evaluation of those people, objects, events, or 
issues (Tesser, 1978; Tesser et al., 1995). 
Individuals can change their beliefs by: a) 
generating new attitude-consistent beliefs, b) 
reinterpreting inconsistent beliefs, and c) 
discounting inconsistent beliefs. Individuals 
creatively change recalled information to 
make consistent what they now know and 
what they initially believed.  
Second, there is a connection between 
feelings and beliefs (e.g., Chaiken & Yates, 
1985; Clary et al., 1978; Rhode, 2001). 
Individuals’ feelings about the 2004 
presidential debate are determined, in part, by 
beliefs those individuals hold about that 
event. When recalling information about the 
2004 presidential debate, for example, 
individuals would probably feel favorably 
about John Kerry if they believe he possesses 
morals and has their best interest at heart. 
Because there is a connection between how 
individuals feel and what individuals believe, 
the affective portion of attitudes (i.e., 
feelings) and the cognitive portion (i.e., 
beliefs) of attitudes are dependent on each 
other to some extent.  
In sum, attitudes depend on beliefs. 
When individuals think about their beliefs, 
individuals change their beliefs thereby 
making those beliefs evaluatively consistent 
with original beliefs about an attitude object 
(i.e., people, objects, events, or issues). As 
individuals reconstruct their beliefs about 
people, objects, events, or issues, individuals 
increase evaluative consistency in their 
beliefs. In turn, individuals make their 
attitudes extreme as a result of thought.    
Generate Additional Information. 
Individuals could produce evaluative 
consistency in their beliefs by generating 
additional attitude-consistent beliefs. For 
example, Tesser and Cowan (1975) found that 
participants presented with a set of four 
adjectives describing a person generated more 
additional descriptions of a person than did 
participants presented with a set of eight 
adjectives describing a person. More 
importantly, as the number of set adjectives 
describing a person increased, the more 
difficult it became for participants to generate 
additional attitude-consistent adjectives. If 
individuals, for example, believe that Howard 
Dean is warm, caring, and compassionate, 
then those individuals may feel favorably 
toward Mr. Dean. Because those individuals 
feel favorably toward Mr. Dean, they may 
also believe that he is sensitive and forgiving. 
Although these individuals may not have 
actually seen Mr. Dean act in such a way, 
they may generate those new beliefs based on 
their initially favorable impression. Thus, 
these individuals have supported their initially 
favorable impression by generating additional 
favorable beliefs about Howard Dean. Other 
researchers have found that individuals 
generate attitude-consistent beliefs when 
given a chance to think about people, objects, 
events, or issues (e.g., Harton & Latane, 
1997; Leone & Ensley, 1985).  
Interpret Existing Information. 
Individuals could also produce evaluative 
consistency in their beliefs by reinterpreting 
ambiguous information. For example, Tesser 
and Cowan (1977) presented participants with 
a group of three personality traits in which 
there also was either an ambiguous adjective 
(i.e., could be interpreted as either positive or 
negative depending on context) or an 
unambiguous adjective (i.e., could be 
interpreted as positive or negative regardless 
of context) as part of a description of a 
person. Participants were more likely to 
polarize their attitudes when presented with 
an ambiguous trait as part of a description 
than when presented with an unambiguous 
trait as part of a description. More 
importantly, participants reinterpreted 
ambiguous traits making those traits 
consistent with other traits describing a 
person. Individuals, for example, may witness 
Howard Dean during a speech exchanging 
hostile words with John Ashcroft. Those 
individuals may interpret Mr. Dean’s words 
as passionate rather than angry in order to 
preserve their favorable feelings about 
Howard Dean. Those individuals may feel 
more favorably toward Mr. Dean if they 
believe he is passionate rather than angry. 
Hence, those individuals reinterpret 
ambiguous information in order to preserve 
their favorable impression about Howard 
Dean. Other researchers have concluded that 
individuals reinterpret their beliefs about 
people, objects, events, or issues making 
those beliefs evaluatively consistent (Feather, 
1967; Lord, Ross, Lepper, 1979; Lord, 1989).  
Refute Inconsistent Information. 
Individuals may also produce evaluative 
consistency in their beliefs by refuting 
inconsistent beliefs. For example, Chaiken 
and Yates (1985) identified participants as 
either high or low in structural consistency. 
Participants high in structural consistency are 
compelled to maintain consistency between 
affective (i.e., feelings) and cognitive (i.e., 
beliefs) components of their attitudes. 
Participants low in structural consistency are 
not compelled to maintain consistency 
between affective and cognitive components 
of their attitudes. These experimenters 
instructed participants to read essays by 
proponents or opponents of a relevant issue 
(i.e., capital punishment or censorship) and 
then to write essays on those issues. 
Participants high in structural consistency 
were more likely than participants low in 
structural consistency to refute and counter 
argue inconsistent information. More 
importantly, participants high in structural 
consistency more than participants low in 
structural consistency polarized their attitudes 
as a result of the connection between thoughts 
and feelings. Individuals, as in the previous 
example, may witness Howard Dean 
exchanging hostile words with John Ashcroft. 
These individuals could refute any of Howard 
Dean’s actions that are inconsistent with their 
favorable beliefs about him. These individuals 
may feel favorably toward Mr. Dean if they 
refute that Howard Dean is an angry man. In 
turn, these individuals can still maintain 
favorable beliefs about Howard Dean if they 
refute that Mr. Dean is an angry man. Thus, 
these individuals’ beliefs remain consistent 
which results in favorable feelings toward 
Howard Dean. Other researchers concluded 
that individuals refute and counter argue 
attitude-inconsistent beliefs in order to 
maintain evaluative consistency in their 
beliefs (e.g. Kuhn & Lao, 1996; Plous, 1991; 
Pomerantz, Chaiken & Tordesillas, 1995). 
 
Situational and Dispositional Factors 
Although researchers found that when 
given opportunity for thought individuals 
polarize their attitudes, there may be 
situational and dispositional factors that are 
involved in individuals’ ability to polarize 
their attitudes. Attitude polarization may be 
attenuated if individuals thoughts are 
constrained (e.g., Leone & Aronow, 1992; 
Leone, Minor, & Baltimore, 1983; Leone & 
Baldwin, 1983; Tesser, Leone, & Clary, 
1978). Attitude attenuation occurs when 
individuals make their evaluation of an 
attitude object less extreme than their initial 
evaluation of that attitude object. Individuals 
may constrain their thoughts by responding to 
reality constraints or process constraints. 
Individuals may implement reality 
constraints during thought when in the 
presence of people, objects, events, or issues 
(Tesser, 1976). A reality constraint occurs 
when individuals compare their beliefs 
concerning people, objects, events, or issues 
with the actual characteristics of those people, 
objects, events, or issues. Individuals, for 
example, may believe that smoking marijuana 
causes people to be violent and aggressive. 
Individuals in the presence of people 
intoxicated on marijuana displaying non-
violent behavior are forced to reevaluate their 
beliefs concerning the effects of smoking 
marijuana. When confronted with the realities 
of people, objects, events, or issues during 
thought, individuals’ beliefs about those 
people, objects, events, or issues may be 
influenced.  
Researchers found that attitude 
attenuation occurs when in the presence of a 
reality constraint. Leone (1984), for example, 
found that participants asked to think about a 
feared object (i.e., snake) in the absence of 
that object polarized their attitudes more than 
did participants asked to think about a feared 
object (i.e., snake) in the presence of that 
object. In a case study by Rothbaum, Hodges, 
Kooper, Opdyke, Williford, and North (1995), 
a patient suffering from acrophobia (i.e., fear 
of heights) reported decreased anxiety and 
avoidance of heights after being exposed to a 
computerized, virtual simulation of varying 
degrees of heights. More importantly, that 
patient reported feeling less afraid of heights 
after being exposed to varying degrees of 
heights than he did before being exposed to 
heights varying degrees of heights.  
In sum, when individuals are faced 
with a reality constraint, they may realize that 
some of their beliefs are inaccurate or 
illogical. When faced with a reality constraint, 
individuals may also realize that some of their 
feelings are exaggerated. If individuals 
abandon faulty beliefs, then attitude 
attenuation occurs.  
 Individuals’ attitude polarization may 
also be reduced by process constraints. 
Process constraints are a way of manipulating 
thought such that individuals are forced to 
examine the derivation of their beliefs about 
people, objects, events or issues (Tesser et al., 
1978). Individuals limited by process 
constraints are forced to think about thinking. 
 Individuals, as in the previous 
example, may believe that smoking marijuana 
causes people to be violent and aggressive. 
When those individuals are asked to reason 
why they believe smoking marijuana causes 
people to become aggressive, those 
individuals are forced to scrutinize the 
legitimacy of their beliefs concerning the 
aggressive effects of smoking marijuana. 
Some of those individuals may reason that 
smoking marijuana causes aggression because 
they felt out of control after smoking 
marijuana. Some of those individuals may 
believe that smoking marijuana leads to 
aggression because they saw an expert in the 
media reporting about the aggressive effects 
of marijuana. Other individuals may think that 
marijuana causes people to become 
aggressive because they saw a movie (e.g., 
Reefer Madness) which portrayed characters 
smoking becoming aggressive after smoking 
marijuana. 
Once those individuals identify why 
they believe that smoking marijuana causes 
aggression, they are able to question the 
legitimacy of those beliefs. After those 
individuals scrutinize the validity of their 
beliefs about the effects of smoking 
marijuana, some of those individuals may 
reason that not every person who smokes 
marijuana loses control. Individuals may 
reason that media reporters have biases and, 
therefore, begin to question the legitimacy of 
information acquired from those media 
reporters. Other individuals may reason that 
movie producers may exaggerate the effects 
of smoking marijuana to boost viewer 
interest. If these individuals identify faulty 
logic in their beliefs about the aggressive and 
violent effects of smoking marijuana, then 
those individuals may abandon those faulty 
beliefs. If individuals abandon faulty beliefs, 
then attitude attenuation occurs.  
Researchers found that process 
constraints are effective in reversing the 
attitude polarization process. In a study by 
Tesser et al. (1978), for example, participants 
instructed to reason why they strongly feared 
public speaking reported less anxiety about 
public speaking than did participants not 
instructed to think about public speaking. 
Participants instructed to think under a 
process constraint found faulty logic in their 
beliefs about public speaking. In turn, these 
participants reduced their fear of public 
speaking. In a study by Leone and Baldwin 
(1983), participants asked to think in a 
constrained manner (i.e., process constraint) 
about a feared object (i.e., snake) displayed 
more approach behavior toward that feared 
object than did participants not asked to think 
in a constrained manner about a feared object. 
Those participants asked to scrutinize why 
they feared snakes, presumably, abandoned 
false beliefs concerning their fear of snakes. 
In turn, those participants increased approach 
behavior toward that snake.  
In sum, when individuals reevalutate 
their beliefs in terms of where those beliefs 
were derived, individuals may identify faulty 
reasoning (Tesser et al., 1978). When 
individuals scrutinize the validity of their 
beliefs, those individuals may also realize 
their beliefs are not plausible. If individuals 
abandon false beliefs, attitude attenuation 
occurs. 
Attitude polarization may also be 
related to certain dispositional factors (i.e., 
personality differences). The way in which 
individuals think about people, objects, 
events, and issues, could moderate the attitude 
polarization process. Some individuals have 
styles of thinking in which these individuals 
make other beliefs consistent with their 
original beliefs concerning an attitude object 
(i.e., people, objects, event, and issues). Other 
individuals have certain styles of thinking in 
which these individuals do not make other 
beliefs consistent with their original beliefs 
concerning an attitude object. These 
personality differences could be differences in 
intolerance of ambiguity. How, then, might 
intolerance of ambiguity be related to self 
generated attitude change? 
 
Intolerance of Ambiguity 
Intolerance of ambiguity, as defined 
by Budner (1962), is a tendency for 
individuals to perceive ambiguous situations 
as threatening. An ambiguous situation is one 
in which individuals cannot structure or 
organize an environment because of a lack of 
sufficient cues from that environment. Budner 
identified ambiguous situations as lacking 
familiar stimuli (i.e., unfamiliar situation), 
including multiple stimuli (i.e., complex 
situation), or including incongruent stimuli 
(i.e., insoluble situation). Individuals, for 
example, may watch newscasts concerning 
the war on terror. If these individuals watch a 
newscast concerning the war on terror on Fox 
Network and then watch a newscast 
concerning the war on terror on CNN, these 
individuals may receive conflicting newscasts 
concerning the war on terror. These 
conflicting views concerning the war on terror 
is an example of an ambiguous situation. 
Individuals can either be intolerant of 
ambiguity or tolerant of ambiguity. 
Individuals intolerant of ambiguity 
perceive ambiguous situations as threatening 
because these individuals need clear and 
consistent cues from their surroundings in 
order to organize and structure an 
environment (Budner, 1962). When 
confronted with an insoluble situation (i.e., 
incongruent cues), these individuals may not 
seek multiple solutions. When confronted 
with a complex situation (i.e., multiple cues), 
these individuals may not integrate multiple 
cues. When confronted with a novel situation 
(i.e., lack of familiar cues), these individuals 
may not connect unfamiliar cues with 
previously acquired knowledge. Individuals 
intolerant of ambiguity experience stress and 
react prematurely when presented with 
ambiguous stimuli. If possible, individuals 
intolerant of ambiguity seek situations that 
provide certainty or avoid ambiguous stimuli 
all together (Furnham, 1994). 
Individuals tolerant of ambiguity, 
however, perceive ambiguous situations as 
desirable, interesting, and challenging 
because these individuals are able structure 
and organize their environment based on an 
array of unfamiliar stimuli (Budner, 1962). 
When confronted with an insoluble situation, 
individuals tolerant of ambiguity may work 
out multiple solutions. When confronted with 
a complex situation, these individuals may 
integrate multiple cues. When confronted 
with a novel situation, these individuals may 
connect unfamiliar cues with previously 
acquired knowledge. Individuals tolerant of 
ambiguity do not experience stress or react 
prematurely when presented with ambiguous 
stimuli. Individuals tolerant of ambiguity 
perceive ambiguous situations as desirable 
and challenging (Furnham, 1994).  
Individuals who differ in intolerance 
of ambiguity also differ in the degree to 
which they prefer novel tasks versus familiar 
tasks (Furnham, 1995). Individuals intolerant 
of ambiguity prefer familiar tasks as opposed 
to novel tasks because a familiar task includes 
sufficient, recognizable cues that allow these 
individuals to structure and organize that task. 
Individuals who engage in a familiar task 
know what to expect from that task and no 
new interpretation of cues is required to make 
sense of that task. In a study by Feather 
(1969), participants high in intolerance of 
ambiguity showed less preference for a novel 
task as opposed to a familiar task than did 
participants low in intolerance of ambiguity.  
Individuals tolerant of ambiguity, 
however, prefer novel tasks as opposed to 
familiar tasks (Furnham, 1995). Individuals 
tolerant of ambiguity are able to interpret 
ambiguous cues because these individuals are 
able to structure a task that includes either 
familiar or unfamiliar cues. These individuals 
do not need an existing definitive 
interpretation of a task in order to understand 
how to complete that task. Ebling and Spear 
(1980), for example, found that individuals 
tolerant of ambiguity perform better on 
ambiguous tasks than do individuals 
intolerant of ambiguity. Although preference 
for a task is different from performance on a 
task, it is probable that because tolerant of 
ambiguity individuals prefer novel tasks they 
are likely to attend to novel tasks and 
therefore perform well on novel tasks. In 
general, researchers have found that 
participants intolerant of ambiguity more than 
participants tolerant of ambiguity have a 
lowered ability to cope with an ambiguous 
task (e.g., Sidanius, 1978). 
Individuals who differ in intolerance 
of ambiguity also differ in the degree to 
which they form rigid categories of stimuli 
(e.g., people, objects, events, or issues). 
Individuals intolerant of ambiguity tend to 
form strict, fixed categories of stimuli 
(Bochner, 1965). These individuals, for 
example, may categorize people as either 
politically conservative or politically liberal. 
Although some people may hold politically 
moderate views (i.e., neither conservative nor 
liberal views), intolerant of ambiguity 
individuals are likely to categorize people 
with politically moderate views as either 
liberal or conservative because these 
intolerant of ambiguity individuals are unable 
to cope with views that are inconsistent with 
politically conservative or liberal views. 
Intolerant of ambiguity individuals are likely 
to place all political views into one of two 
political categories (i.e., conservative or 
liberal) because these individuals formed rigid 
definitions of politically conservative and 
politically liberal people.  
Individuals tolerant of ambiguity, 
however, do not tend to form strict, fixed 
categories of stimuli (Bochner, 1965). These 
individuals, for example, may also categorize 
people as either politically conservative or 
politically liberal. Tolerant of ambiguity 
individuals, however, are not likely to 
categorize all people as either politically 
conservative or liberal. These individuals 
recognize politically moderate views and are 
able to cope with views that are inconsistent 
with politically conservative and liberal 
views. Tolerant of ambiguity individuals are 
not likely to place people into specific 
political categories because these individuals 
have not formed rigid definitions of 
politically conservative or liberal people.  
 Individuals who differ in intolerance 
of ambiguity also differ in the degree to 
which they reject or accept unusual stimuli. 
Individuals intolerant of ambiguity tend to 
reject unusual or different stimuli (Bochner, 
1965). These individuals, for example, may 
believe that all women are incapable of 
holding a position in the Federal Government. 
If these individuals learn of a woman who 
was elected into the House of 
Representatives, these individuals may 
attribute her success to something other than 
her abilities to represent her district.   
 Individuals tolerant of ambiguity, 
however, do not tend to reject unusual or 
different stimuli (Bochner, 1965). These 
individuals are not likely to believe that all 
women are incapable of holding a position in 
the Federal Government. Although there are 
more men than women holding a position in 
the Federal Government, these individuals 
can conceptualize that women holding a 
position in the Federal Government gained 
that position through similar means as men in 
that position. Thus, these individuals do not 
reject the notion that women are just as 
capable as men of holding a position in the 
Federal Government.  
 Individual differences in intolerance 
of ambiguity are related to extreme attitudes. 
One example of an extreme attitude is 
prejudice. Prejudice is defined as an “an 
aversive or hostile attitude toward a person 
who belongs to a group, simply because he 
belongs to that group, and is therefore 
presumed to have questionable qualities 
ascribed to the group” (Allport, 1954, pg 7). 
Hassan and Khalique (1987) looked at 
intolerance of ambiguity and prejudiced 
attitudes toward women, caste-status, and 
religious affiliation. In general, participants 
who held prejudiced attitudes toward women 
also held prejudiced attitudes toward caste-
status and religious affiliation. These 
researchers also found that participants who 
were high in intolerance of ambiguity 
reported more prejudiced attitudes overall 
than did participants who were low in 
intolerance of ambiguity.  
Galbreath and Feinberg (1973) looked 
at the relationship between intolerance of 
ambiguity and attitudes toward employment 
of disabled persons. As predicted, intolerant 
of ambiguity participants reported more 
negative attitudes toward employment of 
disabled persons than did tolerant of 
ambiguity participants. More importantly, 
when exposed to both a highly ambiguous 
employment situation and a highly ambiguous 
employee description, intolerant of ambiguity 
participants more than tolerant of ambiguity 
participants reported negative attitudes toward 
employment of disabled persons. Feinberg 
(1971) also found that participants intolerant 
of ambiguity reported more negative attitudes 
toward disabled persons than did tolerant of 
ambiguity participants. Lal and Hassel (1998) 
and Dermer (1993) explain why these 
individuals intolerant of ambiguity hold 
negative attitudes toward disabled persons. 
These researchers found that individuals 
tolerant of ambiguity more than individuals 
intolerant of ambiguity considered additional 
information about a complex situation (e.g., 
highly ambiguous description of disabled 
persons) to be useful when dealing with that 
complex situation.  
Intolerance of ambiguity is also 
related to other extreme attitudes such as 
racism. Sadinuis (1977), for example, looked 
at the relationship between intolerance of 
ambiguity and socio-political ideology. Socio-
political ideology was comprised of four 
separate components (i.e., racism, political-
economic conservatism, sexual repression, 
and authoritarian aggression). Sadinuis found 
that racism was more strongly related to 
intolerance of ambiguity than were his other 
three components of socio-political ideology. 
In other words, racism was a function of 
increased intolerance of ambiguity.  
As mentioned earlier in this paper, 
individuals can make their beliefs consistent 
by generating additional attitude consistent 
beliefs, reinterpreting attitude inconsistent 
beliefs, and discounting attitude inconsistent 
beliefs. Individual differences in intolerance 
of ambiguity are also related to two of the 
three microprocesses in the self generated 
attitude change model as proposed by Tesser 
(1978). Specifically, intolerance of ambiguity 
is related to reinterpretation of inconsistent 
beliefs and discounting of inconsistent beliefs.  
Individuals engage in reinterpreting of 
beliefs when individuals make new beliefs 
about an attitude object consistent with their 
initial beliefs about that attitude object. 
Individuals, for example, may believe space 
exploration is necessary for the advancement 
of the human race. If these individuals are 
exposed to new information about efforts to 
expand space exploration, then these 
individuals are likely to reinterpret this new 
information so that it is consistent with their 
initial beliefs about space exploration. 
Reinterpreting inconsistent information, 
however, does not happen at the same rate for 
all individuals. Individuals intolerant of 
ambiguity are more likely than individuals 
tolerant of ambiguity to reinterpret 
information making new information 
consistent with initial beliefs. Feather (1967) 
found that participants intolerant of ambiguity 
biased their evaluations of religious 
syllogisms in a manner that was consistent 
with their attitudes more than did participants 
tolerant of ambiguity. Feather concluded that 
participants’ religious affiliation influenced 
evaluations of religious syllogisms made by 
intolerant of ambiguity individuals. 
Researchers have concluded that this 
information selectivity may be accounted for 
by biases in information processing (e.g., 
Lord, Ross, Lepper, 1979).  
Individuals engage in discounting of 
beliefs when individuals refute or ignore 
beliefs about an attitude object that is 
inconsistent with their initial beliefs about 
that attitude object. Individuals, for example, 
may believe that the war on terror is vital to 
the safety of citizens in the United States. If 
these individuals are exposed to discrepant 
information about the war on terror, then 
these individuals are likely to retain only 
information that supports their attitudes about 
the war on terror. Discounting of inconsistent 
information, however, does not happen at the 
same rate for all individuals. Individuals 
intolerant of ambiguity tend to engage in 
discounting of inconsistent information more 
than do individuals tolerant of ambiguity. 
Feather (1969), for example, exposed 
participants to arguments for and against 
American intervention in Vietnam. 
Participants intolerant of ambiguity were 
more likely than participants tolerant of 
ambiguity to ignore information that was 
inconsistent with their initial attitude about 
American intervention in Vietnam and 
recalled information that was consistent with 
their initial attitude about American 
intervention in Vietnam. That is, individuals 
intolerant of ambiguity gave more attention to 
information that was consistent with their 
initial attitude than to information that was 
inconsistent with their initial attitude. 
 
Hypotheses 
Because individuals intolerant of 
ambiguity perceive an ambiguous situation as 
threatening, these individuals may try to 
reduce their anxiety when confronted by 
ambiguous situations by a) generating new 
attitude-consistent information about a 
situation in order to make that situation 
unambiguous, b) reinterpreting inconsistent 
information about a situation in order to make 
that situation unambiguous, or c) discounting 
inconsistent information about a situation in 
order to make that situation unambiguous. 
Individuals tolerant of ambiguity, however, 
are not likely to engage in the aforementioned 
behaviors because these individuals process 
information about ambiguous situations 
differently than do intolerant of ambiguity 
individuals. If individuals process information 
about ambiguous situations differently, then 
this individual difference variable may 
moderate the extent to which individuals 
polarize their attitudes. The present study was 
designed to test the following hypotheses. 
In general, it is expected that 
individuals will experience increased attitude 
polarization with an increased opportunity for 
thought. Individuals will not, however, 
polarize their attitudes at the same rate. This 
attitude polarization process will be 
moderated by individual differences in 
intolerance of ambiguity such that individuals 
intolerant of ambiguity will experience 
greater attitude polarization than will 
individuals tolerant of ambiguity. Last, 
individuals intolerant of ambiguity will 
experience greater attitude polarization with 
an increased opportunity for thought than will 
individuals tolerant of ambiguity regardless of 
thought opportunity condition. These 
hypotheses will be investigated in the 
following experiment.  
 
Method 
Participants 
  A total of 162 students were recruited 
from undergraduate psychology courses for a 
study titled “Individual Differences in 
Political, Social, and Campus Issues.”  By 
volunteering for this study, participants 
earned extra credit for a class. Other extra 
credit opportunities were offered so that 
students were not obligated to volunteer only 
for extra credit.  
There were 103 females and 59 males 
involved in this study. Equal number of 
females and males were not necessary 
because sex of participants was not a 
predictor variable in this study. A majority of 
this sample (71%) was Caucasian. Most 
participants in this study (79%) were between 
18 and 21 years of age. The University of 
North Florida is uncharacteristic of most 
universities in that it has older, non-traditional 
students.  
The experimenter excluded from 
analysis data of three participants because 
those participants failed to follow 
instructions. Participants were given a chance 
to ask questions before they signed a written 
informed consent. Participants were treated in 
accordance with the American Psychological 
Association Ethical Principles and Code of 
Conduct (American Psychological 
Association, 2003).  
 
Procedure    
A female experimenter greeted 
participants individually and informed them 
that this study was designed to assess attitudes 
towards various political, social, and campus 
issues. She also informed participants about 
any potential benefits and risks associated 
with their participation, reminded those 
participants of their right to withdraw from 
participation at anytime without penalty, and 
assured those participants their responses 
would remain confidential. Participants were 
given an opportunity to ask questions. 
Participants then signed a written informed 
consent form prior to completion of this 
study. The experimenter of this study 
interviewed participants on an individual 
basis.  
The experimenter of this study 
counterbalanced the order in which 
participants completed interviews about their 
attitudes and completed the Intolerance of 
Ambiguity Scale (Budner, 1962). Half of 
these participants first completed the 
Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale and later 
completed an interview. The other half of 
these participants first completed an interview 
and later completed the Intolerance of 
Ambiguity Scale. The remaining description 
of this procedure section was organized as if 
participants first completed the interview 
portion and later completed the Intolerance of 
Ambiguity Scale.  
During the interview portion of this 
study, participants read a series of statements 
displayed on note cards. Participants were 
shown statements about a variety of political, 
social, and campus issues. Participants read a 
series of statements that were either positively 
worded (e.g., “Parking should be free for 
professors.”) or negatively worded (e.g., “Gay 
men and lesbian women should not have the 
right to get married.”). Order of statements 
was randomized.  
After each issue was presented on a 
note card, participants verbally expressed 
their attitude by stating aloud a number on a 
15-point, Likert-type scale. Endpoints of that 
scale were labeled strongly agree (+7) and 
strongly disagree (-7).  Midpoint was labeled 
neutral (0). Other points on that scale were 
numbered to correspond to varying degrees of 
agreement or disagreement. Participants could 
choose a “+3” or “+4” to indicate moderately 
favorable attitudes. Participants could also 
choose a “-3” or “-4” to indicate moderately 
unfavorable attitudes. The experimenter used 
a separate coding sheet to record responses. 
Those responses were not available for 
participants viewing.   
After participants expressed their 
attitudes towards each issue, the experimenter 
selected two issues for which participants 
expressed moderately positive attitudes (i.e., 
+4) and two issues for which participants 
expressed moderately negative attitudes (i.e., 
-4). Prior to viewing these note cards again, 
participants were randomly assigned to one of 
two conditions: low opportunity for thought 
(45 seconds) or high opportunity for thought 
(90 seconds).  
 The experimenter then told participants 
there were a few particular issues of interest. 
Half of these participants reread an issue for 
which they held moderately negative attitudes 
first and the other half of these participants 
reread an issue for which they held 
moderately positive attitudes first. The order 
in which participants reread each set of issues 
(i.e., positive or negative) was 
counterbalanced. Participants were then asked 
by the experimenter to think about each issue 
they had just read. She asked participants to 
read one of these four issues of interest and to 
concentrate on that issue. She instructed 
participants to  
Focus on this particular issue only. You 
may want to think about how you feel 
about the issue. You may want to think 
about your beliefs about the issue. Or 
you may want to think about important 
facts and arguments you know about the 
issue. Just think about the issue I am 
about to show you until I tell you to stop 
thinking about it (Leone, 1995). 
The experimenter instructed participants 
to stop thinking once the allotted opportunity 
for thought was over. Participants were then 
asked by the experimenter to rate their 
attitudes about each issue again using the 
same 15-point scale as mentioned above. She 
told participants  
 Now that you have had the chance to 
think about this issue, I would like 
you to tell me once again how you 
feel about this issue. Sometimes 
people’s attitudes change even over as 
short a period of time as this. You 
may or may not feel the same way 
about the issue. Using the scale in 
front of you, please indicate how you 
feel now about the issue (Leone, 
1995). 
The experimenter recorded participants’ 
attitudes on a separate coding sheet. After 
participants finished rerating their attitude, the 
same procedure was repeated for the 
remaining three issues. Participants were 
given either 45 seconds or 90 seconds of time 
for thought on all four issues. 
Attitude polarization was scored such 
that higher scores were indicative of a greater 
tendency for attitude polarization (Leone, 
1995). If an initially favorable attitude (i.e., 
+4, +5) became more favorable (i.e., +6, +7) 
after thought, then attitude change was 
assigned a score of “1”. If an initially 
unfavorable attitude (i.e., -4, -5) became more 
unfavorable (i.e., -6, -7) after thought, then 
attitude change was also assigned a score of 
“1”. If an initially favorable attitude (i.e., +5) 
became less favorable (i.e., +4, -3) after 
thought, then attitude change was assigned a 
score of   “-1”. If an initially unfavorable 
attitude (i.e., -5) became more favorable (i.e. -
4, +3) after thought then, attitude change was 
also assigned a score of “-1”. If attitudes 
remained unchanged after thought, then 
attitude change was assigned a score of “0”. 
The use of a trichotomous index is preferred 
over an algebraic index because a 
trichotomous index is proven to have greater 
validity and have less sensitivity to errors than 
an algebraic index (Tesser, 1978). Scores for 
all four issues were summed together.  
Individual differences in intolerance of 
ambiguity were assessed using the 16-item 
Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale (Budner, 
1962). Budner maintains that ambiguous 
situations are novel, complex, or insoluble. 
Budner wrote several items to assess 
individuals’ perceived threat from novel 
situations (i.e., no familiar cues), complex 
situations (i.e., multitude of cues), and 
insoluble situations (i.e., different cues 
suggest different structures). Four items were 
designed to assess attitudes of perceived 
threat from novel situations, nine items were 
designed to assess attitudes of perceived 
threat from complex situations, and three 
items were designed to assess attitudes of 
perceived threat from insoluble situations. 
Participants rated their degree of 
agreement or disagreement with each of the 
statements in that scale. Participants 
responded using a 5-point Likert-scale: 
strongly agree, slightly agree, uncertain, 
slightly disagree, and strongly disagree. Half 
of those statements were worded positively 
(e.g., “A good job is one where what is to be 
done and how it is to be done are always 
clear.”) and half of those statements were 
worded negatively (e.g., “People who insist 
upon a yes or no answer just don’t know how 
complicated things really are.”). Responses to 
negatively worded items on that scale were 
reverse scored. Answers to items were scored 
such that high scores were indicative of 
greater intolerance of ambiguity and low 
scores were indicative of greater tolerance of 
ambiguity. Based on a median split of the full 
range of scores, participants scoring above the 
median were classified as intolerant of 
ambiguity and participants scoring below the 
median were classified as tolerant of 
ambiguity.  
In order to validate his Intolerance of 
Ambiguity Scale, Budner (1962) administered 
his scale to sixteen different samples. 
According to Robinson and Shaver (1973), 
internal consistency was determined by 
measuring Cronbach’s alpha for scores from 
those sixteen different samples. The range of 
Cronbach’s alpha for scores for these samples 
was from .39 to .62. In a separate study, 
Robinson and Shaver (1973) obtained a test-
retest reliability of r= .85 for scores on this 
scale after a 2 to 4 week period. For scores in 
this study, Cronbach’s alpha was .61.   
Budner’s Intolerance of Ambiguity 
Scale (1962) and three other intolerance of 
ambiguity scales (i.e., Norton’s Multi-
dimensional Scale [Norton, 1975], Rydell’s 
Scale [Rydell & Rosen, 1966], and Walk 
Scale [O’Connor, 1952]) were administered 
to a single sample (Furnham, 1994). Scores 
on Norton’s Multi-dimensional Scale, 
Rydell’s Scale, and Walk’s Scale were 
significantly correlated with scores on 
Budner’s Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale. The 
correlation coefficient between scores on 
Budner’s Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale and 
scores on Norton’s Multi-dimensional Scale 
was, r=.47, p<.05. The correlation coefficient 
between scores on Budner’s Intolerance of 
Ambiguity Scale and scores on Rydell’s Scale 
was, r=.57, p<.06. The correlation coefficient 
between scores on Budner’s Intolerance of 
Ambiguity Scale and scores on Walk’s Scale 
was, r=.44, p<.06.  
Finally, participants answered 
demographic questions about their sex, race 
(i.e., Caucasian/White, Hispanic, African 
American/Black, Asian American, or Other), 
political affiliation (Democrat, Republican, or 
Independent), and age (18-22yrs, 23-27yrs, 28 
yrs-32yrs, 33yrs-37yrs, 38 or more). 
Participants were thanked for their time and 
given an opportunity to ask any questions. 
The experimenter of this study then dismissed 
her participants. 
Results  
Overview 
This study was a 2 (ambiguity: 
tolerant versus intolerant) x 2 (opportunity for 
thought: 90 seconds versus 45 seconds) x 2 
(order of presentation: personality measure 
then attitude measure versus attitude measure 
then personality measure) factorial design. 
Order of presentation was included in this 
analysis for exploratory purposes. Attitude 
polarization was the dependent variable in 
this study. Attitude polarization was 
calculated by summing scores for all four 
issues that participants rated a second time.  
 
Main Analyses  
It was expected that attitude 
polarization would be greater for individuals 
who had ample opportunity for thought (i.e., 
90 seconds) than for individuals who had little 
opportunity for thought (i.e., 45 seconds). It 
was also expected that attitude polarization 
would be greater for individuals intolerant of 
ambiguity than for individuals tolerant of 
ambiguity. Dispositional factors (i.e., 
intolerance of ambiguity) and situational 
factors (i.e., opportunity for thought) were 
expected to have an interactive effect on 
attitude polarization such that individuals 
intolerant of ambiguity having ample 
opportunity for thought would experience 
greater attitude polarization than would 
individuals in any other condition.  
Statistically, it was expected that there 
would be a main effect for opportunity for 
thought and a main effect for individual 
differences in intolerance of ambiguity. It was 
also expected that there would be a two-way 
statistical interaction between intolerance of 
ambiguity and opportunity for thought. Last, 
if there were an interactive effect of order of 
presentation, then there would be a statistical 
three-way interaction between opportunity for 
thought, individual differences in intolerance 
of ambiguity, and order of presentation.    
A two-way ANOVA was conducted to 
determine if there was a main effect for 
opportunity for thought, a main effect for 
individual differences in intolerance of 
ambiguity, and an interaction between 
opportunity for thought and individual 
differences in intolerance of ambiguity. There 
was not a statistically significant main effect 
for opportunity for thought or intolerance of 
ambiguity, both F’s<1.00. There also was not 
a statistically significant interaction between 
opportunity for thought and intolerance of 
ambiguity, F<1.00. A three-way ANOVA 
was conducted with order of presentation as 
an exploratory variable to determine if there 
was an interaction between opportunity for 
thought, intolerance of ambiguity, and order 
of presentation. This three-way interaction 
was non-significant, F <1.00.  
 
Exploratory Analysis 
There was, however, an unexpected 
marginally significant interaction between 
order of presentation and intolerance of 
ambiguity, F (1, 152) = 3.06, p < .08. In order 
to find the source of this interaction, a simple 
main effect analysis was conducted (i.e., two 
one-way ANOVAs). Participants’ completion 
of the Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale then an 
attitude measure was assessed first and 
participants’ completion of an attitude 
measure then the Intolerance of Ambiguity 
Scale was assessed second. Intolerance of 
ambiguity was the predictor variable and 
attitude polarization was the criterion 
variable. There was a significant difference 
between individual differences in intolerance 
of ambiguity when participants completed the 
Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale and then an 
attitude measure, F(1,81)= 3.66, p<.06. 
Participants tolerant of ambiguity who first 
completed the Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale 
(M = 0.74, SD = 1.89) experienced greater 
attitude polarization than did participants 
intolerant of ambiguity who first completed 
the Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale (M = -.06, 
SD = 1.81). Participants tolerant of ambiguity 
(M = .06, SD = 2.14) and participants 
intolerant of ambiguity (M = .39, SD = 2.06) 
who first completed an interview, however, 
were equally likely to experience attitude 
polarization, F <1.00.   
 
 
 
Ancillary Analysis 
 During the thought manipulation 
procedure in this study, participants thought 
about issues that were given moderately 
favorable ratings (i.e., +4) and moderately 
unfavorable ratings (i.e., -4). The researcher 
in this study chose issues for which 
participants had moderately favorable or 
moderately unfavorable attitudes in order to 
prevent ceiling effects or floor effects. 
Moderately favorable ratings and moderately 
unfavorable ratings may be different for 
participants who experienced attitude 
polarization than for participants who did not 
experience attitude polarization. Moderately 
favorable ratings and moderately unfavorable 
ratings may also be different for participants 
intolerant of ambiguity and participants 
tolerant of ambiguity. Moderately favorable 
ratings and moderately unfavorable ratings 
may also be different for participants in the 45 
second thought condition and participants in 
the 90 second thought condition.  
In order to determine if there was a 
possible relationship between individuals’ 
tendencies to be weak or strong in their initial 
ratings and other factors, I took the absolute 
value of all initial ratings and summed those 
values. Low scores were indicative of weak 
attitudes and high scores were indicative of 
strong attitudes. A possible range for scores 
on extremity of initial attitudes was a 
minimum of 0 and a maximum of 280. Actual 
range of scores on extremity of initial 
attitudes was a minimum of 78 and maximum 
of 258. A possible relationship between 
individuals’ tendencies to be weak or strong 
in their initial ratings and attitude polarization 
(i.e., total trichotomous change) was 
examined.  
First, there was no relationship 
between individuals’ tendencies to be weak or 
strong in their initial ratings and overall 
attitude polarization, r = -.01. Second, there 
was no relationship between individuals’ 
tendencies to be weak or strong in their initial 
ratings and individual differences in 
intolerance of ambiguity, r = -.04. Last, there 
was no relationship for participants’ tendency 
to be weak or strong in their initial ratings and 
to which thought condition these participants 
were randomly assigned, r=-.16. Although 
there were individual differences in extremity 
of initial attitudes, those differences were 
unrelated to attitude polarization, intolerance 
of ambiguity, or opportunity for thought 
condition.   
Discussion 
It was expected that, in general, 
individuals would experience increased 
attitude polarization with an increased 
opportunity for thought. It was also expected 
that individuals intolerant of ambiguity would 
experience more attitude polarization than 
would individuals tolerant of ambiguity. Last, 
it was expected that individuals intolerant of 
ambiguity would experience more attitude 
polarization with an increased opportunity for 
thought than would individuals tolerant of 
ambiguity with an increased opportunity for 
thought.  
These hypotheses in this study were 
not supported. Individuals in the low 
opportunity for thought condition and 
individuals in the high opportunity for 
thought condition did not differ in amount of 
attitude polarization they experienced. 
Individuals tolerant of ambiguity and 
individuals intolerant of ambiguity did not 
differ in amount of attitude polarization they 
experienced. Regardless of thought condition, 
individuals intolerant of ambiguity and 
individuals tolerant of ambiguity did not 
differ in amount of attitude polarization 
experienced. In sum, results from this 
experiment were not consistent with 
hypotheses.  
 
Plausible Alternative Explanations 
In terms of the self generated attitude 
change construct, results from this study 
differ from results other researchers obtained 
(see Tesser, et al., 1995, for a review). One 
possible explanation for results obtained in 
this study may be due to the nature of thought 
manipulation. In other words, allocated times 
for the opportunity for thought manipulation 
may have been too long or too short. These 
two times may not have been adequate to see 
differences in attitude polarization. In some 
studies, for example, researchers included 
increasing increments of opportunity for 
thought (e.g., Tesser & Conlee 1975). Tesser 
(1976), for example, instructed participants to 
think about an attitude object for 30, 60, 90, 
and 180 seconds. In other studies, researchers 
included a control condition during which 
participants were not given a chance for 
thought or were distracted from thought (e.g., 
Chaiken & Yates, 1985; Harton & Latane, 
1997). Participants in this experiment were 
instructed to think about an assigned issue for 
either 45 seconds or 90 seconds. Other 
researchers, however, found attitude 
polarization when participants were given 45 
versus 90 seconds of thought (e.g., Leone, 
1996). Although this explanation (i.e., thought 
manipulation not adequate) is possible, this 
explanation may not be probable. Results 
from this study, therefore, may not be due to 
the nature of thought manipulation.  
In this study, participants experienced 
more attitude attenuation than attitude 
polarization. Researchers have found that, 
when individuals compare their beliefs 
concerning people, objects, events, or issues 
with the actual characteristics of those people, 
objects, events, or issues (i.e., reality 
constraint), attitude attenuation occurred (e.g., 
Rothbaum, et al., 1995). Researchers have 
also found that when individuals are forced to 
examine the derivation of their beliefs about 
people, objects, events or issues (i.e., process 
constraint) attitude attenuation occurred (e.g., 
Leone & Baldwin, 1983). Perhaps there was 
an element of this procedure that 
inadvertently involved reality or process 
constraints. If participants think under reality 
constraints or processes constraints during 
thought about an assigned issue, then 
participants may experience attitude 
attenuation (e.g., Clary, et al., 1978).  
In terms of the intolerance of 
ambiguity construct, results from this study 
differ from results other researchers obtained 
(e.g., Feather, 1969). In this study, 
participants completed Budner’s Intolerance 
of Ambiguity Scale (1962). In other 
intolerance of ambiguity studies, participants 
completed other measures intolerance of 
ambiguity. Examples of intolerance of 
ambiguity measures used in other studies 
include McDonald Scale (1970), Rydell-
Rosen Scale (1966), and Norton’s Scale 
(1975). Scores on these aforementioned 
measures of intolerance of ambiguity may be 
more valid than scores on Budner’s 
Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale (see Furhnam, 
1994 for a review). If scores on Budners 
Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale are not valid, 
then there would not be an effect for 
intolerance of ambiguity on attitude 
polarization. 
Although there are differences in 
validity for scores on Budner’s Intolerance of 
Ambiguity Scale and scores on other 
measures of intolerance of ambiguity, this 
explanation (i.e., lack of validity for scores on 
Budner’s Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale) 
may not be probable. Researchers have 
demonstrated that scores on Budner’s 
Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale (1962) have 
test-retest reliability (see Robinson & Shaver, 
1973). Researchers also demonstrated 
convergent validity with three other measures 
of intolerance of ambiguity (ref). Last, 
researchers demonstrated construct validity 
for Budner’s Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale 
in that scores on this scale are related to other 
theoretically meaningful constructs such as 
prejudice and racism (e.g., Hassan & 
Khalique, 1987; Sidanius, 1978). Budner’s 
Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale was selected 
for use in this study because it is the most 
cited and widely used intolerance of 
ambiguity scale. Results of intolerance of 
ambiguity on attitude polarization in this 
study, therefore, are not likely due to a lack of 
validity or reliability for scores on Budner’s 
Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale. 
Although researchers have 
demonstrated that scores on this scale are 
reliable and valid, perhaps intolerance of 
ambiguity is not related in a meaningful way 
to self generated attitude change. There may 
be other constructs, however, that are related 
to self generated attitude change. These other 
constructs may include need for cognition and 
dogmatism. 
Need for cognition is the degree to 
which individuals engage in and enjoy 
effortful cognitive endeavors (Cacioppo & 
Petty, 1982). Individuals can either be high in 
need for cognition or low in need for 
cognition. Individuals high in need for 
cognition tend to engage in and enjoy 
effortful thought. These individuals “prefer 
complex to simple problems” (Cacioppo, 
Petty, & Kao, 1984). Individuals high in need 
for cognition also tend to scrutinize the merits 
of a message (i.e., central route) when 
determining their attitudes about an issue 
(Cacioppo & Petty, 1981). On the other hand, 
individuals low in need for cognition do not 
tend to engage in and enjoy effortful thought. 
These individuals “find little satisfaction in 
deliberating hard and for long hours” 
(Cacioppo et al., 1984). Individuals low in 
need for cognition also tend to rely on 
heuristics (i.e., peripheral route) such as 
source attractiveness or length of message 
when determining their attitudes about an 
issue (Cacioppo et al., 1981). Researchers  
found that, when given an opportunity for 
thought, individuals low in need for cognition 
polarize their attitudes more than do 
individuals high in need for cognition (cf., 
Lassiter & Apple, 1998; Lassiter, Apple, & 
Slaw, 1996; Leone, 1994; Leone & Ensley, 
1986).  
Dogmatism has been conceptualized 
in terms of differences in the nature of belief 
systems. Individuals use belief systems to 
understand their world around them and to 
protect themselves from potentially 
threatening information and ideas (Rokeach, 
1960). Individuals can either be dogmatic or 
non-dogmatic. Dogmatic individuals’ belief 
systems are characterized by a high degree of 
isolation. These individuals may 
compartmentalize or separate beliefs that 
other individuals would integrate. Dogmatic 
individuals avoid, ignore, or selectively forget 
attitude-discrepant information because these 
individuals find inconsistency of beliefs 
intolerable (e.g., Leone, 1989). On the other 
hand, non-dogmatic individuals’ belief 
systems are characterized by a high degree of 
openness. These individuals can make 
connections between beliefs that are logically 
related. Non-dogmatic individuals do not 
ignore, avoid, or selectively forget attitude-
discrepant information because these 
individuals find inconsistency of beliefs 
tolerable (e.g., Leone, 1989). Researchers 
found that, when given an opportunity for 
thought, dogmatic individuals polarize their 
attitudes more than do non-dogmatic 
individuals (e.g., Leone, 1989; Leone, Taylor, 
& Adams, 1991).  
Although the there was no effect for 
self generated attitude change and intolerance 
of ambiguity in this study, there was an 
unexpected interaction between order of 
presentation and intolerance of ambiguity. 
Participants intolerant of ambiguity were 
equally likely as participants tolerant of 
ambiguity to experience attitude polarization 
when asked to first complete an attitude 
measure and then complete Budner’s 
Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale. Participants 
intolerant of ambiguity were more likely than 
participants tolerant of ambiguity to 
experience attitude attenuation when asked to 
first complete the Intolerance of Ambiguity 
Scale and then complete an attitude measure. 
 One possible explanation for this 
unexpected finding may be a priming effect 
(Srull & Wyer, 1980). A priming effect 
occurs when activating a schema increases 
accessibility for individuals to readily use that 
activated schema (Srull & Wyer, 1980). 
Individuals are likely to use schemas for 
which they have been primed because these 
schemas are accessible. When participants 
answer questions about themselves, 
participants’ self-concepts become accessible 
(Wentura & Greve, 2005). When participants 
completed the Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale 
first, participants may have become aware of 
their tendency to be tolerant or intolerant of 
ambiguity. Participants who are intolerant of 
ambiguity have different self-concepts from 
participants who are tolerant of ambiguity. 
Participants who are made aware that they are 
intolerant of ambiguity may have 
incorporated into their self-concept that they 
are rigid and narrow minded. Participants who 
are made aware that they are tolerant of 
ambiguity may have incorporated into their 
self-concept that they are indecisive and 
ambivalent. In turn, participants may feel 
uncomfortable by their self-concept.  
Participants who were made aware of 
their tendency to be intolerant of ambiguity 
may have attempted to respond in ways that 
would disconfirm negative stereotypes (e.g., 
narrow-minded) about individuals intolerant 
of ambiguity. Participants who were made 
aware of their tendency to be tolerant of 
ambiguity may have attempted to respond in 
ways that would disconfirm negative 
stereotypes (e.g., ambivalent) about 
individuals tolerant of ambiguity. Researchers 
maintain that stereotype threat occurs when 
individuals are concerned with confirming a 
negative stereotype (e.g., African Americans 
as unintelligent) of a group to which these 
individuals belong (Steele & Aronson, 1995). 
Individuals who experience stereotype threat 
may try to disconfirm negative stereotypes 
about themselves (Steele & Aronson, 1995). 
These individuals, for example, may 
disengage from group norms in order to 
disconfirm a stereotype (Aronson, Blanton, & 
Cooper, 1995; Steele, 1997). If participants 
intolerant of ambiguity were made aware of 
the fact they were intolerant (i.e., rigid), then 
these participants may have responded in 
ways that would disconfirm the stereotype of 
intolerant individuals as rigid. In one 
condition, participants completed the 
Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale (Budner, 
1962) first. As a result of being primed to 
think about their self-concept, participants 
may have become aware of the degree to 
which they are intolerant of ambiguity. 
Perhaps participants intolerant of ambiguity 
modified responses in an effort to appear 
more socially acceptable (i.e., adaptable) than 
socially unacceptable (i.e., rigid). If 
participants modified responses in an effort to 
appear socially desirable, then participants 
would experience attitude attenuation rather 
than attitude polarization. 
 
Limitations of Current Thesis    
One possible limitation in this study is 
the unknown validity of the opportunity for 
thought manipulation. Although participants 
were instructed to think about a particular 
issue for either 45 seconds or 90 seconds, 
participants may not have been thinking about 
that assigned issue. Alternatively, participants 
were perhaps thinking about an issue when 
instructed to do so, but then may not have 
engaged in any of the self generated attitude 
change microprocesses (i.e., generate 
additional beliefs, reinterpret existing beliefs, 
or discount inconsistent beliefs). In other 
words, just because participants were 
instructed to think about an issue does not 
mean that these participants thought about 
that assigned issue. Also, participants may 
have thought about assigned issues but did not 
generate additional thoughts about those 
assigned issues, reinterpret existing thoughts 
about those assigned issues, or discount 
inconsistent thoughts about those assigned 
issues. If participants did not think about an 
assigned issue or did not engage in the self 
generated attitude change microprocesses 
when thinking about an assigned issue, then 
these participants would not experience 
attitude polarization. 
A second possible limitation of this 
study may be the use of political, social, and 
campus issues. Researchers have shown that 
participants with well developed mental 
representations (i.e., schemas) experience 
more attitude polarization than do participants 
with poorly developed mental representations 
(e.g., Tesser & Leone, 1977). Participants 
may not have had well developed schemas for 
some or all of the issues used in this study. 
One example of an issue used in this study is 
“Euthanasia should be a legal, personal 
choice”. Some of these participants, for 
example, may not be familiar with the 
concept of euthanasia. If participants do not 
have well developed schemas for these issues, 
then these participants are not able to engage 
in the self generated attitude change 
microprocesses.  
A third possible limitation of this 
study is the use of self-report measures. 
Participants responded to a self-report 
measure when they rated their degree of 
agreement or disagreement toward each issue. 
Participants also responded to a self-report 
measure during completion of Budner’s 
Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale (1962). When 
participants respond to a self-report measure 
they are susceptible to certain response sets 
(e.g., social desirability or acquiescence 
responding).  
Participants may attempt to respond in 
a socially desirable manner to statements 
about each issue as well as to items on the 
Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale (Budner, 
1962). Participants engage in social 
desirability responding when they respond to 
statements in ways which makes them look 
good to themselves or others (Rosenberg, 
Nelson, & Vivekananthan, 1968). 
Participants, for example, may agree or 
disagree with an issue based on how these 
participants think most college students feel 
about that issue. If participants think that most 
college students hold negative attitudes 
toward a particular issue, then these 
participants may respond in a socially 
desirable fashion by indicating a negative 
attitude toward that particular issue. When 
participants respond in a socially desirable 
manner, researchers are not accurately 
measuring participants’ attitudes.  
Participants may also acquiesce with 
responses to statements about each issue as 
well as to items on the Intolerance of 
Ambiguity Scale (Budner, 1962). Participants 
engage in acquiescence responding when they 
agree with any statement that sounds 
reasonable (Zuckerman, Knee, Hodgins, & 
Miyake, 1995). Participants, for example, 
may agree that professors should not have to 
pay to park on campus because participants 
think that this statement sounds reasonable. 
When participants simply agree with a 
statement about an issue because it sounds 
reasonable, researchers are not accurately 
measuring participants’ attitudes.  
 
Future Directions 
Researchers could include a 
manipulation check for the opportunity for 
thought manipulation. Researchers, in 
previous studies, have used illuminated lights 
as a means of instructing participants to think 
about an attitude object (Tesser, 1976). 
Researchers could instruct participants to 
illuminate a light when thinking about an 
assigned issue. If participants are indicating 
they are thinking about an assigned issue by 
illuminating a light, then researchers know 
participants are engaging in thought. 
Although researchers can measure if 
participants are thinking about an assigned 
issue when participants illuminate a light, 
researchers cannot, however, use this 
manipulation check to measure what 
participants are thinking about during 
thought. If researchers want to measure what 
participants are thinking about during thought 
about an assigned issue, then researchers can 
instruct participants to write arguments or 
ideas concerning an attitude object (e.g., 
Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979; Pomerantz, 
Chaiken, &Tordesillas, 1995).   
Researchers could also include several 
different measures of intolerance of 
ambiguity. Researchers could determine 
convergent validity if participants completed 
several intolerance of ambiguity scales. If 
researchers included different measures of 
intolerance of ambiguity, then researchers 
may have increased confidence with effects 
for intolerance of ambiguity on attitude 
polarization. 
Researchers could also include other 
kinds of stimuli (e.g., paintings, fashion) for 
which participants think about during an 
opportunity for thought. In this study, the 
participants thought about political, social, or 
campus issues. These issues may have been 
too broad to get an effect for attitude 
polarization. Instead of measuring attitudes 
for a broad range of issues, researchers in 
future studies could measure attitudes about 
specific issues (e.g., “war on terror”).   
Researchers could also include the use 
of priming effects with different personality 
variables such as dogmatism. Participants 
may access their self-concept if they become 
aware of certain personality characteristics 
(e.g., dogmatic). Once participants are primed 
with knowing their personality characteristics, 
researchers could then study if participants 
are susceptible to stereotype threat. 
Researchers studying stereotype threat 
generally examine this effect with a specific 
group of people (e.g., Women or African 
Americans) for which stereotypes are salient. 
Although some researchers (e.g., Brown & 
Pinel, 2003) examined the effects of 
stereotype threat with individual difference 
variables (e.g., stigma consciousness), 
researchers have not examined stereotype 
threat with political affiliation. Although 
individuals who affiliate with different 
political agenda possess certain personality 
characteristics, these characteristics are not 
usually salient. Once individuals are made 
aware that they posses certain characteristics, 
individuals may become aware of stereotypes 
concerning these characteristics (e.g. liberals 
as bleeding-hearts, conservatives as “moral-
order” elitists). If participants are made aware 
of certain personality characteristics (e.g., 
liberal vs. conservative), then researchers may 
find an effect for stereotype threat with 
personality variables.  
Recall the opening paragraph. 
Individuals who favored conservative 
positions (e.g., personal responsibility) 
supported by President George W. Bush may 
have donated money to his political party. 
Individuals who favored liberal positions 
(e.g., social responsibility) supported by 
Senator John Kerry may have stood along 
busy roadways flashing signs in support of his 
party. If, however, conservative voters 
involved in Bush’s campaign were made 
aware of negative stereotypes of 
conservatives as insensitive to working-class 
citizens then these conservatives may try to 
disconfirm these negative stereotypes by 
voting against party lines. In turn, if liberal 
voters involved in Kerry’s campaign were 
made aware of negative stereotypes of liberals 
as financially irresponsible, then these liberals 
may try to disconfirm these negative 
stereotypes by voting against party lines. 
Understanding attitudes and the mechanisms 
of attitude change has broad, real world 
implications.  
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